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Sammendrag 
Standard økonomisk teori gir klare retningslinjer for hvordan kostnadseffektive virkemidler skal 
utformes ved ufullkomne markeder og eksternaliteter. Observert virkemiddelbruk viser imidlertid 
store uoverensstemmelser fra prinsippene for en kostnadseffektiv virkemiddelbruk. Basert på 
intervjuer med sentrale politikere fra Stortingets Energi- og miljøkomité undersøker vi årsaker til 
manglende kostnadseffektiviteten i norsk klima- og energipolitikk. 
 
Vi finner at politikerne hovedsakelig ønsker en kostnadseffektiv virkemiddelbruk i prinsippet, men at 
de fremfor å innføre effektive virkemidler rettet direkte mot det enkelte klima- eller energipolitiske 
målet, inkluderer mål som industri- og regionalutvikling, inntektsfordeling og sysselsetting i 
utformingen av klima- og energipolitiske virkemidler. 
 
Manglende innsikt i de komplekse effektene av økonomiske instrumenter og en forståelse av en ikke-
bindende budsjettbetingelse kan også føre til manglende kostnadseffektivitet i 
virkemiddelutformingen.  
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1. Introduction 
The development of efficient policy measures is a key focus in economic energy and climate research. 
Standard economic theory provides clear guidance on the design of cost-efficient policy in the 
presence of imperfect markets and externalities (Diamond and Mirrlees 1971, Sandmo 1975, Ballard 
and Fullerton 1992). In a first-best world, cost-efficient policy maximizes net benefits and ensures the 
optimal provision of goods and services. A cost-efficient climate policy internalizes external emission 
costs through taxes or tradable emission permits such that the marginal costs of abatement equal the 
marginal costs of environmental damage. Optimally, there is one instrument designated for each 
policy goal.  
 
In practice, climate and energy policy instruments include exceptions from the first-best principle, and 
multiple instruments combining different forms of externality pricing and subsidies are typically used. 
Tax reductions or exemptions and subsidized electricity prices are all examples of deviations from 
first-best efficient solutions. Consequently, the implementation of actual energy and climate policy 
makes any initial environmental targets more costly to achieve. This is a general trend in most 
countries.1 
 
In this paper, we study the underlying political motives that may cause the observed deviations from 
cost-efficient instrument design, based on interviews with elected members of the Norwegian 
Parliament. We aim to gain insight into the politicians’ attitudes and motivations underlying their 
perception of a social welfare function (SWF) and how this correspond to targets that appear favoured 
in present instruments. Moreover, we investigate inefficient policy choices resulting from potential 
information failures and lack of budget constraints. 
2. Theoretical framework 
Studying the political feasibility of policy instrument designs is an important extension in policy 
analyses. For example, when explaining the difference between ‘desirable and possible’ instruments 
(Meltsner 1972), the importance of target groups and lobbyism have often been in focus (see e.g. 
Buchanan and Tullock 1975, Daugbjerg and Svendsen 2003, Gullberg and Skodvin 2011). Following 
public choice theory and the work of Olson (1965), an important feature in studies of political 
feasibility within environmental economics has been the potential for organized lobby groups to 
protest general environmental taxes successfully. In contrast, poorly organized groups, such as the 
household sector, will not protest strongly, as the cost of raising opposition is often larger than the tax 
costs. Svendsen (1998) analyses why it was not possible to set a uniform Danish CO2 emission tax at 
                                                     
1 See, e.g. OECD Economic Instruments Database, www2.oecd.org/ecoinst/queries/ or Sumner et al. (2009). 
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the desired level from 1992 without the presence of a compensating refund system. While it was not 
apparent who the winners of this policy were, the potential losers were well-organized industries that 
could protest effectively. This supports Becker’s (1983) argument that while government will tend to 
choose the most efficient policies to maximize net benefits, they also wish to redistribute revenues 
from weak to strong pressure groups and therefore choose policies that enable them to do this most 
effectively. 
 
We study the political reasoning underlying environmental and energy policy, using interviews with 
government politicians. Norwegian energy and climate policy serves as a, with representative 
example of deviations from a cost efficienc environmental policy design. While official reports and 
documents emphasize the cost-efficiency and polluter-pays principles in climate and energy policies2, 
the practical policy formulations diverge from these principles.  
 
We conduct our analysis based on an economic conception of welfare. Welfarism, as defined by Sen 
(1979), measures social welfare as a function of personal well-being (measured by individual utility 
functions derived from individual preferences). This function links personal and social utility, but is 
not necessarily a summing of individual utilities as in the basic utilitarian approach (Besley 1994). 
The SWF provides a social utility index for a collection of individual goods (Bergson 1938, 
Samuelson 1983) such that W = W(u1, u2, …, un) where W yields the social utility from any 
distribution of private utilities, un. While the existence of the SWF is hypothetical, the underlying idea 
is that it can capture societal preferences on how we can compare individual utilities to obtain an 
ordering of possible social outcomes (Mas-Colell et al. 1995). One interpretation is that it represents 
the preferences of a social decision-maker about how to trade the utilities of different individuals 
(Varian 1992). The social planner should then maximize social welfare, i.e. to maximize W(u1(x), 
u2(x), …, un(x)), where x represents consumption bundles at some given budget constraint. A well-
specified SWF should then reflect the preferences for the distribution of income and welfare (Stiglitz 
2008). An optimal policy maximizes social welfare, given some feasibility constraints, with policy 
made by a benevolent dictator. Because of the potential for different weightings of the utility over 
individuals, welfarism involves diverse equity concerns leading to dissimilar optimal policies if 
perfect redistribution is not possible. We simplify this theoretical framework by assuming that 
democratically elected members of the Norwegian Parliament represent and maximize the SWF.  
 
                                                     
2 See e.g. Ministry of Environment 2007, NOU 1992, NOU 1996, Arbeiderpartiet et al. 2008, Recommendation to the 
Storting no. 145 
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The elected parliamentarians represent different political parties. Because of their broad public 
support, we consider the political preferences of these parliamentarians as an indicator for the social 
welfare function. 
 
We take the SWF and the maximization of this function as the key determinants of policy design. 
Using members of the Standing Committee on Energy and the Environment in the Norwegian 
Parliament as a case study, chapter 5 seeks to unveil whether efficiency versus equity considerations 
are important for policy makers in policy choice. Chapter 6 explores actual distributional concerns 
included in the SWF using carbon pricing and energy subsidies as policy cases.3 An optimal 
maximization of a given social welfare function relies on assumptions of perfect information, a 
binding budget constraint, available instruments to regulate the desired area and agreement between 
the private welfare function of the decision-maker and the social welfare function. Chapters 7-9 
analyze potential efficiency losses due to discrepancies between some of these assumptions and actual 
policy development. We question the assumptions of a perfectly informed decision maker, a perceived 
binding budget constraint and the importance of re-election for the politicians’ private welfare 
function using different policy cases.  
3. Method 
Members of the Standing Committee on Energy and the Environment in the Norwegian Parliament 
have a great potential influence on policy formulation and the welfare distribution. To reveal the 
complexity of attitudes, we employed qualitative interviews. The interviews were carried out during 
the spring of 2010. The results are not statistically representative and only hold for the persons 
interviewed. The respondents were members of the relevant committee in the 2005–2009 and/or the 
2009–2013 election periods. Of 18 invited respondents, 11 participated. Committee members who did 
not respond to our initial invitation to participate or a follow-up request were seen as non respondents. 
Before the interview, the participants received information about the project goals and the publication 
procedures. We structured the interviews around premade interview guides along with follow-up 
questions.  
 
 
 
                                                     
3 Cost-efficient policies maximize the total resources and could be potentially Pareto preferred to policies maximizing the 
SWF with respect to both efficiency and equity concerns, given an assumption of lump-sum transfers of wealth. Improving 
cost efficiency leaves room for the compensation of policy losers. However, full compensation through lump-sum transfers 
rarely takes place (Helfand et al. 2003), because of problems with identifying winners and losers, measuring gains and losses 
and differences in the organizational power of the interest groups (see e.g. Peltzman 1976). Instead, politicians compensate 
by making exemptions from optimal externality prices. The limited scope for lump-sum transfers then reduces efficiency. 
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During the interviews, we emphasised not to get involvement in genuine conversation such as 
responding to questions or providing personal opinions. Given the actions of politicians are generally 
public and documented, their stated considerations are likely consistent with their support to the 
practical policy formulation. Moreover, as politicians state their positions in different forums and at 
different times, they face a demand for consistency that is likely to lead them to better clarify their 
goals, considerations and strategies (Engelstad 2010). The respondents appeared comfortable with the 
interviewing process and their responses appeared generally well formed and thought through. We 
believe these responses form a high quality fundament to the study of political reasoning behind 
policy choices and formulations. 
4. The relevant policy formulations 
We focused the questions on climate policy, green certificates, and renewable energy subsidies. These 
are all policy areas characterized by the use of multiple instruments violating efficiency 
recommendations and potentially affecting several interest groups. A cost-efficient policy implies 
equal marginal abatement costs across emission sources, and carbon taxes and tradable emission 
permit systems are potential cost-efficient instruments. 
 
Norway introduced a carbon tax in 1991. However, the carbon tax is not cost efficient in that it is 
limited to the use of fossil fuels for energy purposes and there is a variety of emission sources with tax 
rate reductions or exemptions (see e.g. Sumner et al. 2009, Ministry of Finance 2012). Only the 
emissions from combustion are taxed and process emissions are not included, process and fishing 
industries are exempted the tax, the wood products and the fishmeal industry have reduced tax rates, 
while the tax levels are higher than the average level for the petroleum industry and the household 
sector.  
 
In 2005, Norway introduced a system of emission tradable permits (ETS). Mainly based on free 
quotas, the system regulated the same sources and gases as the EU quota system, with exemptions for 
emissions already regulated by the carbon tax. The system was expanded and linked to the EU ETS in 
2008 and includes some of the industries exempted from the carbon tax, such as parts of the process 
industry (NOU 2007, Norwegian Climate and Pollution Agency 2012). Offshore the petroleum carbon 
tax is reduced to compensate the increased cost due to the ETS. 
 
A common green certificate market between Norway and Sweden was set in place in 2012 as an 
instrument to increase the production of renewable energy. The green certificate system is principally 
a combined tax on energy consumption (with exemptions for, e.g., energy-intensive industry) and a 
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subsidy on new renewable energy production. The system was in the decision process at the time of 
the interviews.  
 
Both the subsidy and the tax elements contribute to lower purchasing prices, which favours exempted 
consumption. Existing power producers finance the system mainly through lower profit. The burden 
on consumers (other than those exempted) is less certain, as the tax contributes to higher prices and 
the subsidy to lower prices. It remains an empirical question whether total production and the 
consumption of electricity increase or decrease. 
 
In Norway, a variety of subsidy schemes also aims to reduce energy use and to encourage renewable 
energy. The main arguments for these systems are to increase the reliability of the supply of energy 
and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.  
5. Do the politicians comply with the cost-efficiency principle? 
The public debate sometimes indicates scepticism to the cost-efficiency principle and to economic 
thinking in general. Economists are typically seen as ‘lobbyists for efficiency’ in policy formulation 
(see Hahn 2000). Cost efficiency is often associated with a heavy reliance on market forces, cuts in 
public budgets, and a representation of profit-maximizing ideology with an emphasis on ‘hard’ 
materialistic values, as opposed to ‘soft’ values like social relations, regions, employment and the 
environment.  
 
Most of the politicians expressed that they were familiar and positive to the cost-efficiency principle. 
To the question, ‘How do you perceive a cost-efficient climate policy?’, eight of the 11 respondents 
answered either that most possible cuts should be made for a given cost, or that the given cuts should 
be at minimum cost. The polluter-pays principle is cost efficient if the polluter pays the marginal cost. 
Seven respondents raised this as a potential guideline in their work, and all were positive to the 
principle. Common statements were that ‘The polluters should pay’ and ‘Those who use energy 
should pay’. Hence, we did not find any principal disagreement with the cost-efficiency principle as a 
reason for the lack of cost efficiency in practical policy. 
 
However, the respondents immediately challenged the cost-efficiency principle when confronted with 
practical policy. For instance, about half of the respondents were clearly against a uniform CO2 tax. 
Five respondents explicitly expressed that they favour a uniform tax, but were concerned about the 
conflict between a cost-efficient policy and the practical political consequences. In particular, most of 
the respondents modified the principle when discussing the manufacturing industry, claiming that the 
tax should also depend on the ability to pay. At the same time as favouring cost efficiency, the 
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politicians also desire a ‘fair’ distribution of the costs. This implies that policy is formulated to attend 
to both equity and efficiency considerations and that the different elements that the politicians include 
in the welfare function are important factors to understand actual policy making. 
6. Distributional elements in the social welfare function  
To uncover the elements that are important for energy and climate policies we focused on 
distributional considerations in carbon pricing and energy subsidies. We also questioned whether the 
politicians employed climate and energy policy to achieve other goals, e.g. carbon tax exemptions as a 
means of obtaining support for regional development and certain industries. 
6.1. Policy case: Carbon pricing 
The range of views on the purpose of carbon taxes is exemplified by one politician stating ‘other 
considerations are the most important aspect of climate policies’ and another claiming ‘climate policy 
has a higher weight than many other policy areas. […] other considerations are included to reach 
climate policy goals’. 
 
All of the respondents supported carbon tax exemptions in the process industries. The main arguments 
were concerns about competitiveness and carbon leakage (see 7.1). Typical statements were that 
‘Norway should not use regulations specific to our country’, ‘…in the long run, the process industry 
also needs to pay, but not at the cost of competitiveness’, and ‘…the global conditions of competition 
should be equal’. 
 
The concerns for industry and competitiveness closely relate to a concern for employment. About half 
of the respondents explicitly emphasized employment in the Norwegian manufacturing sector as a 
priority in climate policy formulation. A typical statement was ‘…there is a contradiction between my 
principle in favour of a uniform carbon tax and my desire to keep the industry in Norway and to not 
lose Norwegian workplaces’, and ‘…there is a problem with emission leakages and loss of 
workplaces’. The general view was that ‘…if the industry flags out, global emissions will increase’. 
Other aspects mentioned regarding industrial considerations were the importance of maintaining the 
proprietary rights of domestic industry, creating green industries, securing the trade balance, 
upholding Norwegian production, and avoiding closing down industry as a goal in itself. 
 
The politicians were asked to value the importance of some pre-specified considerations in carbon tax 
and ETS policy formulation, on a scale from 1 (not important) to 5 (very important), see Table 1.  
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Table 1. Average and number of politicians viewing different considerations as very impor-
tant when pricing carbon 
Considerations Average Number of candidates
responding 4 or 5 
Party affiliation 
Emission leakages 4.8 11 1 SOC, 4 LA, 1 CEN, 
1 CHR, 2 CON, 2 PRO 
Industrial interests 
 (e.g. employment in different branches) 
 
4.0 9 1 SOC, 3 LA, 1 CEN, 
2 CON, 2 PRO 
Other environmental considerations 
 
3.8 5 2 LA, 1 CHR, 1 CON, 
1 PRO 
Regional interests 
(e.g. regional employment and settlement) 
2.8 3 1 LA, 1 CEN, 1 CON 
Income distribution 2.4 2 1 LA, 1 CON 
Public revenue  2.3 2 2 LA 
Note: Abbreviations (total number in sample): SOC = The Socialist Left Party (1), LA = The Labour Party (4), CEN = The Centre Party (1), 
CHR = The Christian Democratic Party (1), CON = The Conservative Party (2), PRO = The Progress Party (2) 
 
The responses confirm the general statements made in the open interviews. All of the respondents 
value emission leakage as important or very important in their climate policy formulation. Nine of the 
respondents also valued industrial considerations as important or very important, with an average 
value of 4.0. Almost half of the 11 respondents judged environmental considerations other than 
climate change as important or very important with an average value of 3.8. Regional development, 
income distribution, and public revenue were generally less important, with average values between 
2.3 and 2.8. The party affiliations reveal no specific pattern in the politicians’ statements. 
 
The politicians agreed on ambitious national abatement targets, while at the same time exempting 
many industries from regulation. All of the politicians supported a higher rate of taxation for the 
petroleum sector. The arguments given followed the same logic as the process industry, but with the 
opposite sign ‘…they manage to bear the burden’, ‘…their ability to pay is good’, ‘…the profit and 
the margins are good’, and ‘…there is no flagging out’. The politicians may principally agree with the 
cost-efficiency principle, but do not follow it in practice. Instead, they place the burden of emission 
reductions on sources where they perceive the costs are lower in terms of effect on employment or 
relocation of emissions. For example, the politicians oppose emission taxes for the process industry 
given production is likely to be affected. Several of the politicians claimed that the tax ‘…has been a 
successful project’ by contributing to emission reductions through technological changes in the 
petroleum sector, and increased environmental awareness. Notably, these mechanisms would also 
prevail if applied to the presently exempted sectors, but the effects and outcomes for employment and 
regional development could have been fundamentally different due to lower margins. 
 
The politicians reflected the same attitudes to the high tax burden borne by the household sector and 
the tax on transport oils. Many of the respondents stressed the polluter-pays principle, ‘…the tax is 
correct since it should cost to pollute’. This was inconsistent with the same political argument used for 
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exempting some industries. One respondent argued, ‘…it is easier to carry through changes in the 
households, than changing the general terms for the industrial sector’. This confirms the findings of 
the extant literature (Olson 1965, Becker 1983, Svendsen 1998), indicating that losing groups that are 
hard to identify and poorly organized, such as the household sector, will not protest strongly while 
small and well-defined groups will derive benefits from lobbying against regulation. Politicians will 
then attempt to redistribute revenues from relatively weak to relatively strong pressure groups. 
 
None of the right-wing parties (PRO and CON) explicitly argued in favour of the high transport oil 
tax, but their arguments against it were rather vague, including ‘…in general, taxes are too high’ and 
‘…many households carry a too high burden’ without proposing any specific change. The other 
respondents were explicitly satisfied with a high tax burden for the household sector; one argued 
‘…our living standard implies that the tax is OK’. High taxes appear acceptable to politicians as long 
as there is no risk of leakage; as one representative stated: ‘the households can’t move abroad’. In 
fact, those respondents arguing for changes in the carbon tax rate wanted an even higher tax for the 
transport sector and offshore facilities. The exception was a single representative who wanted lower 
taxes on transport oils. Only one representative argued consistently for an equal tax for all sectors, and 
maintained acceptance of the costs in terms of the closing down of some industries. The politicians 
also expressed a lack of concern for the increased burden on private consumers in relation to green 
certificates. Those who believed prices would increase were positive to higher electricity prices for 
consumers. 
 
Some of the parliamentarians were of the opinion that the tax on the petroleum sector was mainly 
fiscally motivated. As one of the respondents put it, ‘…the resources are bound to the Norwegian 
shelf. We can thus balance their total tax burden’. The same reasoning applies to the household sector, 
with one parliamentarian of the opinion that ‘…it is more a fiscal tax than an environmental tax’. 
According to these preferences, carbon taxes are mainly instruments to raise revenue for other policy 
objectives. Following Ramsey (1927), fiscal taxes should be levied on those tax bases least likely to 
distort economic activity.4 The tax exemptions used to support certain industries undermine 
efficiency, regardless of whether the taxes are Pigouvian or fiscal. 
6.2. Policy case: Energy subsidies 
Different forms of non-fossil energy subsidies are commonly seen as policy alternatives to efficient 
pricing of carbon emissions in Norway as well as in other countries (OECD 2007, Bye and Bruvoll 
                                                     
4 An optimal fiscal tax should be inversely proportional to the own-price elasticity of demand (Ramsey 1927, Diamond and 
Mirrlees 1971). 
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2008). Subsidies imply a wedge between the marginal production cost and the marginal willingness to 
pay and hence imply efficiency losses for society as a whole.  
 
All of the politicians expressed support for subsidies. However, they did not seem to believe that 
subsidizing renewable energy and energy savings contributed to the reduction of carbon emissions, 
but rather expressed uncertainty about the relationship between energy subsidies and emissions. Only 
three respondents clearly believed that more renewable energy would reduce the use of fossil energy, 
not in Norway, but by influencing the overall emission target in the common European energy and 
emission markets. 
 
For the most part, the arguments given reflected concerns for other political goals. Typical objectives 
were to ‘…release more energy for export’, ‘…renewable technology as an export article is a good in 
itself’, ‘…has employment effects’, ‘…improves reliability of supply’ and ‘…renewable energy is 
good in itself’. Generally, it appears politically easier to offer solutions involving public spending 
(‘gifts’) rather than taxes (‘punishment’). As one politician responded when arguing in favour of 
subsidies, ‘…carrots are positive in themselves—it is positive to use positive instruments’. 
 
Hence, when it comes to renewable energy subsidies, we may conclude that the objectives of 
politicians differ from the emission targets as formally stated in the policy documents. Politicians 
have other goals in mind, such as industrial support and employment. Nonetheless, when we 
questioned whether they prefer taxes to subsidies, or combinations in the climate policy formulation, 
they return to the theoretical scheme. Six of the politicians preferred taxes to subsidies; the reasons 
given were generally grounded in cost-efficiency concerns. For example, ‘…taxes are more targeted 
with regards to emissions’, ‘…it is important to use market instruments—to help the market on its 
way it is easier to use a tax’, ‘…subsidies imply more bureaucracy’, ‘…subsidies are less predictable’, 
and ‘…market participants are more aware of taxes than subsidies’. Three of the politicians favoured 
using both taxes and subsidies in climate policy, i.e. ‘…we need both sticks and carrots’, ‘…taxes 
alone can strike unfairly’ and ‘…taxes and subsidies have different areas of use’ 
 
We find that the reduction of global emissions, employment, industry competitiveness and regional 
development are important elements in the politicians’ SWFs.5 The theoretically optimal policy imply 
solving each political goal with specific instruments. If compensation to losing parties with lump-sum 
transfers were practically possible, maximizing social welfare by means of cost-efficient instruments 
would yield potential Pareto improvements. Instead, aspects other than greenhouse gas emissions are 
included partially in climate policy formulation, undermining efficiency. The politicians’ lacking 
                                                     
5 This is in line with considerations given in the literature, such as by Azar (2010). 
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belief in emission reduction effects of subsidies to renewable energy supports the impression that 
emission concerns are traded against other interests. 
7. Are the politicians fully informed? 
Optimizing social welfare relies on perfect information of the functioning of policies and their effect 
on society. If consumers and producers do not know the prices and quality of products, market 
imperfection and efficiency losses may occur. A number of studies have addressed environmental 
policy given bounded rationality in recent years (see Gsottbauer and van den Bergh 2011). However, 
whether the decision-makers are fully informed has received rather less attention. The functioning of 
economic instruments is complicated, and the mechanisms are generally difficult, or even impossible, 
to fully understand. Optimal choices of economic instruments rely on complex information about the 
simultaneous interaction between markets and considerations of all relevant elements in the welfare 
function. For example, the total emission effects not only depend upon the first-order effects on the 
production and consumption of the goods directly exposed to emission taxes, but also upon general 
relative price changes elsewhere in the market. The dispersed effects of instruments and emissions 
may be alienating to public perceptions of a ‘strong and efficient climate policy’ as proposed by 
economists. 
 
To study the political information level relative to the available knowledge, we questioned the 
parliamentarians about their understanding of carbon leakages, emission permits, and green 
certificates. 
7.1. Policy case: Carbon leakages 
Domestic carbon policy may influence international fossil fuel prices and prices on energy-intensive 
products. This contributes to increased energy demand, and increased production of energy-intensive 
products such as metals, cement, and chemicals in other countries. The empirical evidence suggests 
that the leakage effects are mainly in the range of 10–30 per cent of national emission reductions (see 
e.g. Paltsev 2001, Böhringer and Löschel 2002, Babiker and Rutherford 2005, Fischer and Fox 2007, 
McKibbin and Wilcoxen 2008, Böhringer et al. 2010, Bruvoll et al. 2012), when disregarding 
coordinated international policy such as cap-and-trade systems. The reason that leakages are less than 
100 per cent is that market effects generally reduce net production, and that new production plants 
generally base their equipment on more effective technologies. Also, increasing emissions abroad 
may lead to counteracting policies in other countries. If a regulated firm is part of an emission trading 
system, such as the EU ETS, total emissions will not change per definition. 
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In contrast to the academic literature, the politicians expressed a clear apprehension that leakages 
imply increasing global emissions, i.e. a carbon leakage of more than 100 per cent. The representative 
view of the politicians is that ‘…the technology of the Norwegian process industry is on the 
international front regarding emissions, and shutdowns in Norway are negative for the climate’ and 
‘…we cannot risk flagging out if there is carbon leakage and the emissions take place there’. It is a 
common view that ‘…the process industry in Norway is exempt from carbon tax due to profitability 
and will otherwise flag out, so the exception is OK’. Eight of the 11 respondents emphasized 
increased emissions given the flagging out of Norwegian industry. When asked to rank different 
concerns (see Table 1), all of the politicians ranked emission leakages as either a 4 or 5, which placed 
emission leakages as the most important concern when considering carbon pricing. 
 
The unanimous concern for leakages, and following support in favour of the process industry, is rather 
surprising given the lack of scientific basis. In conclusion, we find relatively large discrepancies 
between political knowledge and the theoretical and empirical foundation for the functioning of this 
important climate policy instrument. Such information failure is likely to imply inefficient political 
solutions, which are not in line with the politicians’ SWF. 
7.2. Policy case: Emission permits 
The emission trading system creates an efficient solution to achieve an emission target. The market 
determines the prices of emission permits while the emission target is set. Three of the respondents 
expressed concerns that the price is ‘too low’. However, the price level does not indicate whether the 
emission target is reached successfully.6 Nonetheless, the politicians appeared concerned that low 
permit prices signal that the system in some sense is inefficient. 
 
Another source of potential misunderstanding relates to the grandfathering of permits. Whether the 
emission permits are grandfathered or auctioned does not influence total emissions or the marginal 
abatement costs. In fact, if optimally formulated, the incentives to reduce emissions and their 
effectiveness are principally the same for both systems.7 The difference is that an auction implies that 
the polluters must pay for the remaining emissions. Several of the respondents claimed that free 
allowances meant the system did not work. Common statements were that ‘….free emission permits 
imply poorer incentives and are less efficient than auctioning’, ‘…grandfathering implies higher 
emissions’ and ‘…too many free permits imply too many permits’. One respondent claimed that free 
permits contributed to efficiency losses and a worsening of incentives to cut emissions. 
                                                     
6 In the long run, low permit prices signal that the costs of reaching the total target are low and this may contribute to more 
ambitious long-run targets. 
7 Grandfathering can imply strategic planning and leave the instrument less effective. 
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These statements counter the functioning of the permit markets. However, this scepticism may 
express a view that the total quota is set too high, as the higher the quota, the lower the permit price. 
Parliamentarians may then confuse lower prices as a signal of increasing emissions. We conclude that 
the statements signal potential information failures regarding the functioning of the emission trading 
system. 
7.3. Policy case: Green certificates 
There are some clear and some uncertain effects of the green certificate system. The main certain 
effects are that producer prices and industry consumption prices will decrease, subsidized energy 
production will increase, and non-subsidized energy production will decrease. The effects on other 
consumer prices and energy production and total consumption rely on the specific market conditions. 
Empirical studies show that consumer prices will decrease and total energy consumption will increase 
for small certificate shares (Bye 2003) 
 
Despite the general uncertainty, three respondents stated with certainty that the system would lead to 
higher consumer prices, and two did not think there would be any changes. Four of the politicians 
emphasized that the price effect was uncertain. Some argued that the system would contribute to 
increased accessibility to energy in general and hence lower prices. The market effect is unclear in 
general. New renewable energy production will certainly increase, but it can be counteracted by 
reduced ordinary market based electricity production. Finally, several politicians admitted they were 
not aware of the certificate duty exemptions for manufacturing. Rather, they expressed that ‘…those 
consuming energy should pay’. Manufacturing accounts for about 40 per cent of all electricity 
consumption in Norway.  
 
In general, the interviews reveal significant information failures about an instrument that was heavily 
debated at the time of the interviews. The main impression was that the respondents were most 
concerned with the effect on the increased renewable energy production. This may point back to the 
political goals of supporting manufacturing industries.  
8. Do the politicians perceive a budget constraint? 
To maximize the SWF, the decision-maker must face the social budget constraint, as potentially 
represented by the yearly general national budget. In practical policy, the budget constraint is less 
clear-cut for the decision makers. Rather than facing the total national budget constraint, they face 
several uncoordinated budgets, such as sector budgets (their ministry) or regional budgets (the county 
from which they are elected). The budget consequences also often run longer than their elected period, 
and the policy instruments can affect budgets outside their area of responsibility (i.e. negative 
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externalities). Optimization of the SWF requires an inter-temporal budget constraint, but practical 
procedures hinder optimal transfers between budgets over time. 
 
Hence, parliamentarians do not necessarily face the alternative costs or benefits from public spending 
and tax increases. This can violate the incentives for making cost-efficient priorities at the national 
level. For example, if a member of the Committee on Environment and Energy has strong priorities 
for rural development without being able to sway the budget influencing this area, they may use their 
position to avoid environmental regulations in rural areas. The sum of such adjustments will diverge 
from what would be the outcome if the politicians made all their priorities within the national budget 
(which is, of course, not practical). To gain insight into the relation to budget constraints, we 
questioned the politicians about their attitudes to reduced public income in the green certificate 
system and the expenses involved in energy subsidies. 
8.1. Policy case: Green certificates and energy subsidies 
The green certificate system will reduce producer prices and hence profit in existing power plants. As 
most Norwegian power production has governmental or municipal owners, the system particularly 
hits public owners and reduces revenues and hence public budgets. There was a clear view that this 
was a ‘fair’ consequence of the green certificate system. The politicians expressed that 
‘…hydropower is incredibly profitable’ and that ‘…the plants have good margins’. Another expressed 
that ‘…they are publicly owned and I have no bad conscience for this’. These statements are similar 
to the arguments for the high offshore industry taxes, where fairness arguments also prevail. None of 
the politicians issued any concern for the impact on public revenue. We conclude that politicians 
perceive a very weak link between public income from energy resources and actual policy expenses. 
 
Subsidizing renewable energy production generally implies lower consumer prices and the transfer of 
costs from energy consumers to public budgets. Only two of the respondents argued that there was a 
conflict with the polluter-pays principle. One even explicitly asked for higher energy prices to finance 
the production costs.8 
 
Cost-efficient solutions maximize social outcome and hence the political space for the redistribution 
of wealth. However, these mechanisms are complex and the social gains from each efficiency 
improvement may be blurred and tend to drown out in the overall resource allocation. It does not 
seem like the politicians have oversight over the relationship between policy efficiency gains and the 
                                                     
8 The prevalent view of the politicians was that the positive effects from increased energy production were beneficial to 
society as a whole, and for both current and future generations. This was, for example, expressed as ‘…energy is socially 
beneficial to everybody, regardless of the size of the consumption’, ‘…the benefits to industry and employment imply 
that…some of this must be paid by the social community’, ‘…the global warming problem justifies a common effort’ and 
‘…if only the energy users covered the costs, the production level of renewable energy would not be sufficient’. 
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implicit impact on public budgets. When we asked the politicians to describe exactly what cost 
efficiency meant to them, none brought up the potential for increased total social welfare. 
9. Do concerns for re-election influence policy? 
If the politicians have self-interest in their position, their personal interests can conflict with the SWF 
because an individual’s personal preferences do not necessarily coincide with their social preferences 
(Nyborg 2000). This yields potential conflicts between the perceived SWF and the likelihood of re-
election. Work by Harrington (1993) explores the role of re-election pressure in economic policy and 
shows that the less uncertain voters, the more likely a politician is to implement the policy that is 
more expected to be well received rather than the one that maximizes income. 
 
We asked the politicians whether the concerns of their election province influenced their policy-
making, how important it was that their decisions provided results in the current election period, and 
finally, we asked, ‘The voters of your party may have other views regarding solutions than what your 
party finds best. Has the thought of re-election been a dilemma for you in climate policy?’ 
 
Eight of the respondents answered that re-election was not important for them. One argued that 
politicians have to relate to the voters or else they will lose their position in the next election, and if 
not re-elected, it would be impossible to influence policy. Three politicians clearly considered 
themselves as representatives of their province’s interests. One of these stated the importance of re-
election. Meanwhile, two politicians clearly expressed that they saw themselves as representing the 
whole country, while one politician meant that provincial concerns were mainly important for 
politicians elected outside the capital Oslo. In general, few of the respondents expressed the opinion 
that re-election concerns influenced their policy-making. Paradoxically, many suspected that the other 
politicians had such motives. Due the belief that others had private motives and the nature of the 
question we find no clear answer to whether there is a disagreement between the private welfare 
function of the decision-maker and the social welfare function that may lead to inefficiencies. 
10. Conclusions  
Maximization of the SWF is a key determinant of policy design. Principally, the SWF includes both 
efficiency and distribution considerations. However, an efficient maximization relies on the 
assumptions of an informed optimizer, a perceived binding budget constraint, available instruments to 
regulate the desired area, and agreement between the decision-maker’s private welfare function and 
the social welfare function.  
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In practical climate and energy policy formulation, exceptions from and countermeasures to the cost-
efficient first-best principle is more the rule than the exception, see, e.g. Sumner et al. (2009). Most of 
the interviewed politicians, agree with the cost-efficiency principles, but reduction of global 
emissions, employment, industry competitiveness and regional development are found to be important 
elements in the politicians’ SWFs. Implemented policies indicate that employment, industry 
competitiveness, and regional concerns are included partially in climate policy formulation. Climate 
policy then serves multiple purposes. This undermines efficiency relative to a policy mixture where 
one instrument serves each political goal. Lacking ability to compensate losing parties may be an 
important cause to inefficient policies. 
 
We find relatively large discrepancies between political knowledge and the theoretical and empirical 
foundation for central climate policy instruments. Politicians also reveal a weak understanding of the 
link between efficiency and economic benefits. Such information failures are likely to imply political 
solutions that are inefficient and not in line with the politicians’ actual SWF, and can contribute to 
explain the discrepancies between principles and practise.  
 
This research points to the role of economists and social scientists to communicate and inform about 
the functioning of complex instruments. Further, improved compensation procedures could help 
reduce the politicians’ incentives to undermine efficiency in order to avoid unwanted distributional 
effects. 
 
Deviations between the social welfare function and the politicians’ private welfare functions, such as 
the valuation of re-election, can also be a source to inefficiencies. However, it is difficult to see the 
alternative to re-election in democracies with decision makers chosen to represent our preferences.  
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Appendix 1 Respondents: 
Name  
Affiliated 
party 
Hallgeir Langeland SOC 
Eirin Kristin Sund LA 
Marianne Marthinsen LA 
Terje Aasland LA 
Torstein Rudihagen LA 
Erling Sande CEN 
Line Hjemdal CHR 
Peter Skovholt Gitmark CON 
Anonymous CON 
Tord Lien PRO 
Ketil Solvik-Olsen PRO 
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